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Introduction 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States has transferred close to a 
hundred individuals suspected of terrorism to foreign jurisdictions through a process 
known as extraordinary rendition.  This is an infamous program that allows for the 
transfer of individuals to a foreign jurisdiction for interrogation, detention, or trial.  While 
the use of extraordinary rendition attracts widespread controversy regarding its use and 
legality, it remains a vital tool for combating international terrorism.  Evidence in this 
thesis lends support to extraordinary rendition program, but recognizes that while the 
program strengthens the country’s ability to gather vital intelligence to combat terrorism, 
there are methods to improve the program.  The extraordinary rendition program requires 
an assessment of the totality of circumstances before a extraordinary rendition is 
permitted; reliance on diplomatic assurances from countries that hold a good human 
rights record; and subsequent monitoring of individuals rendered to foreign states to 
ensure that transfers comply with U.S. and international law.  
Evidence suggests that extraordinary rendition aids in the ability to gather 
sensitive intelligence and serves as a gathering tool used by American presidents to 
preserve freedom and peace; however, in the eyes of critics, this program represents a 
perversely autonomous and un-American legal maneuver that avoids due process.  This 
thesis seeks to discuss common misconceptions associated with the extraordinary 
rendition program and identify the major points of controversy.  The first part explores 
the history of the extraordinary rendition program and provides an understanding of its 
roots and procedures.  The second part, discusses the executive branch’s attempts to 
conduct extraordinary renditions morally and responsibly, and examines the legal 
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oversight and accountability gaps surrounding the program.  Part three identifies the line 
of authority empowering the President to conduct extraordinary renditions.  It also 
outlines the struggle of the legislative, judicial and executive branches to strengthen the 
extraordinary rendition program’s compliance with the rule of law by increasing 
oversight and accountability.  Finally, Part four discusses the future of the extraordinary 
rendition program.  The discussion presents possible solutions to correct oversight and 
accountability problems and suggests a multi-faceted approach that raises the bar for 
extraordinary renditions, thereby closing the oversight and accountability gaps.  
  3
Part One: History of Rendition 
Extraordinary rendition is the transfer of a foreign national suspected of terrorism 
with the involvement of the United States or its agents to the jurisdiction of another 
country for “justice” through interrogation, trial, or some other judicial process.  This is 
typically a joint venture between the United States and a foreign state after receiving 
diplomatic assurances that the individual will not be tortured.1  Extraordinary rendition 
does not offer any guarantee of due process and is often associated with indefinite terms 
of imprisonment.2  This program has grown under the direction of the Bush 
Administration since the 9/11 attacks.3   
As a result, controversy concerning extraordinary rendition has misled the public 
to believe that this covert action is a new practice invented by the Bush Administration; 
however, extraordinary rendition in its most recent inception has been employed in every 
administration since President Clinton.4  This program is distinguished from rendition, 
which involves the transfer of a person from one jurisdiction to another for purposes of a 
trial.  
The Clinton Administration paved the way for the rendition program in 1998.5  In 
response to the wave of terrorist attacks--including the bombing of the World Trade 
Center in 1993, the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, and a subway attack 
in Tokyo—President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directives (PDD), PDD-39 in 
                                                          
1 Sapna G. Lalmalani, Extraordinary Rendition Meets the U.S. Citizen: United States' 
Responsibility Under the Fourth Amendment, 5 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 13 (2005). 
2 J. Troy Lavers, Extraordinary Rendition and the Self Defense Justification: Time to 
Face the Music, 16 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 385, 393 (2007). 
3 Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law of War, 33 N.C.J. Int'l L. 
& Com. Reg. 657, 665 (2008). 
4 Id. 
5 Beth Henderson, From Justice to Torture: The Dramatic Evolution of U.S.-Sponsored 
Renditions, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 189, 196 (2006). 
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June 1995 and PDD-62 in May 1998.  These directives reiterated that terrorist threats 
were not just a law enforcement issue, but also a problem of national security.  Clinton’s 
directive declared: 
Terrorism is a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act 
and we will apply all appropriate means to combat it.  In doing so, the 
U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and pre-empt, apprehend and 
prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who 
perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.6 
 
PDD-39 allowed the United States to apprehend and render terrorists to foreign 
states.  PDDs-39 and 62 outlined a key procedural responsibility: “rendition and 
disruption. ...If a terrorist suspect is outside of the United States, the CIA helps to catch 
and send him to...a third country.... If possible, they seek help from a foreign 
government.”7  The program focused renditions on a small number of targeted 
individuals transferred to a foreign state where they stood trial or faced detention.  These 
individuals could not challenge their removal to the foreign state.  The overall goals of 
rendition remained a focus on the deterrence of terrorist activities and a reliance on 
political convenience by bypassing the enforcement of extradition treaties.8 
In response to 9/11, the Bush Administration re-defined the goals of the rendition 
program to adapt to the terrorist threat.  As stated by Cofer Black, the previous Director 
of the Counterterrorist Center of the CIA “there was a ’before' 9/11 and ’after' 9/11.  
                                                          
6 See Presidential Decision Directive-39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 
1995), at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 
7 The Committee on International Human Rights, Torture by Proxy: International and 
Domestic Law applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions, 60 The Record 13, 39 (2004).   
8 Matteo M. Winkler, When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law and 
European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program. 30 LOY. L.A. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 33 (2008). 
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After 9/11 the gloves came off.”9  President Bush signed secret directives on September 
17, 2001, known as memoranda of notifications, which authorized the CIA without 
proper government approval and due process to engage in the extraordinary rendition of 
individuals suspected of terrorism.10  The Bush Administration redefined the rendition 
program as the extraordinary rendition, which resulted in the transfer of aliens, suspected 
of terrorist activities to third-party countries for the purposes of detention and 
interrogation without the prospect of any formal charges.11   
                                                          
9 Robert Johnson, Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right. 43 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1135 (2009). 
10 Id. at 42. 
11 Michael John Garcia, CRS Report RL32890 3, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by 
Laws on Torture (2009). 
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Enhanced tactics, such as forceful interrogations to pre-empt further terrorist 
attacks, were necessary to deal with terrorist suspects.12  According to the Congressional 
Research Service Report on Renditions (CRS), written by Legislative Attorney Michael 
Garcia, extraordinary rendition post-9/11 is now routinely initiated for the purpose of 
arrest, detention, and/or interrogation by the state receiving the detainee.13 
To support the aggressive use of extraordinary renditions, John Yoo, an attorney 
for the Department of Justice, wrote the now infamous memorandum that justified the 
President’s authority to utilize broad powers during a time of war.14  As a result, the 
extraordinary rendition program has engendered intense debate concerning the 
interrogation of terror suspects in various parts of the world.  Law professors, journalists, 
human rights activists, editorial writers, reporters, policymakers, judges, and members of 
all branches of government have debated and scrutinized the particular practice of 
extraordinary rendition.  The CIA and other U.S. government agencies state that 
extraordinary renditions are used for a “limited number of cases...designed only for the 
most dangerous terrorists and those believed to have...valuable information, such as 
knowledge of planned attacks, and that the intelligence retrieved from these and other 
detainees is critical in the war against terror.”15  Further, the United States maintains that 
using the process of extraordinary rendition is a method utilized to protect national 
security.16  The ability to render an individual suspected of terrorist activities to a foreign 
state is a vital for strengthening and protecting national security because it allows 
                                                          
12 Frankopan, supra note 3, at 665. 
13 Garcia, supra note 11, at 3. 
14 Johnson, supra note 9, at 1136. 
15 Jay M. Zitter, Challenges to Extraordinary Rendition, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 2d, 1 (2010). 
16 Lavers, supra note 2, at 393. 
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continuing exchange of intelligence information from the foreign state.17  However, 
critics claim that the rendition program is used to transfer terror suspects to foreign 
countries exclusively for interrogation, during which torture and human rights violations 
occur.18  With the potential for human rights violations, opponents of the rendition 
program argue that it is difficult to understand the justification for extraordinary 
renditions.19  The new United States model for extraordinary rendition has led to 
controversy, and opponents question whether the United States is upholding the rule of 
law. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Id. at 402. 
18 Seth T. Bridge, Russia’s New Counterterrorism Law: The Legal Implications of 
Pursuing Terrorists Beyond the Borders of the Russian Federation, 3 COLUM. J. E. 
EUR. L. 1, 54 (2009). 
19 Lavers, supra note 2, at 391. 
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Part Two: Extraordinary Rendition: The Legal Controversies 
Extraordinary rendition is an intelligence-gathering tool that transcends party 
lines.20  When confronted with a dangerous foreign national, and limited options of 
detention or interrogation exist, proponents of the extraordinary rendition argue that this 
program offers a solution.  The United States may not have the authority to detain the 
suspect due to a lack of admissible evidence, even though the U.S. has incontrovertible 
information that the individual poses a threat.21  U.S. laws prevent indefinite detention of 
an individual.  As a result, extraordinary rendition escapes U.S. jurisdiction by 
transferring the suspect to his home, or a third country for purposes of intelligence 
gathering.    
According to Michael Scheuer, the chief architect of the extraordinary rendition 
program, “[extraordinary renditions are] an entirely appropriate and essential practice for 
the clandestine service of the United States to conduct in the defense of America.”22  
Scheuer stated that this program is the single most effective counterterrorism tool ever 
used by the government.23  The CIA program focuses on the capture of high-level al-
Qaeda leaders.24  Leading counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna, who consulted 
several intelligence agencies, argued that rough tactics “can save hundreds of lives.”  He 
                                                          
20 Mario Silva, Extraordinary Rendition: A Challenge to Canadian and United States 
Legal Obligations under the Convention Against Torture, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 313, 
331 (2009). 
21 Diplomatic Assurances and Rendition to Torture: The Perspective of the State 
Department’s Legal Adviser Before the House of Representative Subcommittee on 
International Organizations Human Rights, and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
110th Con. (statement of John B. Bellinger, III,  Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State) (2008). 
22 Zak M. Salih, Use of Extraordinary Renditions Has Changed; Risk of Torture Hasn’t, 
Panellists Say (2006), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/rendition.htm. 
23 Johnson, supra note 9, at 1145. 
24 Id. 
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asserted that, “when you capture a terrorist, he may know when the next operation will be 
staged, so it may be necessary to [render] … a detainee.  I disagree with physical torture, 
but sometimes the threat of it must be used.”25  
David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, both attorneys in Washington, D.C., served 
in the White House and U.S. Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush.  They are proponents of extraordinary rendition.  They argue that 
international law does not forbid the transfer of individuals from one country to another 
for the purposes of detention or interrogation, even if the government renders the detainee 
to a country with a poor human rights record.  Extraordinary renditions may occur as long 
as the detainee is not tortured or treated in an inhumane manner.26  “There is no doubt 
that mistakes can occur in [the] rendition process, just like they occur in the criminal 
justice system.”27  Rivkin and Casey argue that the potential for a mistake must be 
weighed against the disaster that would follow from failing to pursue a lead and obtain 
vital intelligence in the war on terror.  Further, intelligence officials struggle with the 
choice between risking another 9/11 attack or “aggressively prosecuting every terrorist 
lead and possibly detaining the wrong person.”28   
Executive branch officials such as President Bush and the former Director of the 
CIA Michael Hayden defended the extraordinary rendition program by advancing a 
utilitarian view, stating that extraordinary rendition works because it produces valuable 
                                                          
25 Interview with Rohan Gunaratna, August 11, 2009. 
26 David Rivkin, Lee Casey, and Charles Stimson, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and the U.S.  Detainee Policy (2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/Common-Article-3-of-the-Geneva-
Conventions-and-US-Detainee-Policy.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
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intelligence.29  Proponents of the program advance the policy that extraordinary 
renditions allow the United States to protect itself against terrorist attacks by arresting an 
individual and sending him or her country of origin or a third county with diplomatic 
assurances that the individual will not be tortured.30  The debate over extraordinary 
rendition centers around the balance between the liberties extinguished versus the 
liberties preserved: it demands a choice.  Extraordinary rendition raises the issue of 
whether presumed protections by the U.S., through the reliance on diplomatic assurances, 
are adequate to overcome human rights concerns.  The Bush Administration advanced a 
utilitarian belief that morally wrong actions can be justified through a morally correct 
outcome.  In short, the President took a stance that the ends justified the means. 
James L. Pavitt, retired Director of the CIA supported the Administration’s 
strategy, stating that the extraordinary rendition program had been “carefully vetted and 
approved by the National Security Council (NSC) and disclosed to the appropriate 
congressional oversight committees.”31  The CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) 
analyzed the extraordinary rendition process through appropriate legal channels before 
approving any extraordinary rendition.32  Specifically, the Director and legal counsel of 
the CIA, along with the NSC lawyers approved the legal brief supporting extraordinary 
renditions after scrutinizing all details and techniques.33  Further, the head of CTC and 
Deputy of NSC received updates anytime there was a change in the procedure of a 
                                                          
29 Frankopan, supra note 3, at 685. 
30 Still At Risk, Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture 114 (2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/04/14/still-risk-0. 
31 Louis Fisher, Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press 
in Post 9/11 America: September 20-21, 57 Am. U.L. Rev. 1405, 1422 (2008). 
32 Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The Story of the CIA Torture Program 151 (St. Martin’s 
Press 2006). 
33 Id. 
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extraordinary rendition.  The highest level of authority approved extraordinary renditions 
and President Bush finalized the decision after all appropriate channels reviewed the 
decision.  A former unnamed CIA agent stated that “everything we did, down to the 
tiniest detail, every [extraordinary] rendition…was scrutinized and approved by 
headquarters.  And nothing was done without approval from the White House- from 
[Condoleezza] Rice herself and with a signature from John Ashcroft.”34  While errors 
occurred “it is impossible not to have mistakes in the business of espionage and 
intelligence...it was deadly business, and if we were wrong, we were wrong.  But the 
evidence pointed us toward what we did.”35  Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez stated 
that the U.S. does not advance the policy of sending individuals “to countries where we 
believe or we know that they’re going to be tortured,” but he also conceded that the 
administration “can’t fully control” what occurs after a transfer to a third country.36 
After the approval of an extraordinary rendition, the CIA transferred the suspect 
to a third country for outstanding legal process.37  The President approved the 
extraordinary renditions, and the covert action did not depend on the availability of 
another country’s outstanding legal process against the suspect.38  “The decision made the 
already successful [extraordinary] rendition program even more effective.”39  Due to the 
                                                          
34 Id. at 151. 
35 Id. at 152.  
36 Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Mooring: Recovering the war Power, 81 IND. L.J. 
1199, 1245 (2005). 
37 Johnson, supra note 9, at 1141. 
38 Michael Scheuer, Extraordinary Rendition In the U.S. Counter Terrorism Policy: The 
Impact of Transatlantic Relations, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 
Subcommittee on Europe. 17 13 (2007). United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. 6 Jun 2009, 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/sch041707.htm. 
39 Id. 
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constraints of limited manpower, the extraordinary rendition program prioritized high-
ranking officials of al-Qaeda with the goal to inflict as much damage as possible, 
specifically against financiers, field commanders, strategists, logisticians, terrorist 
operatives, and leaders.  Scheuer stated that, to his knowledge, the CIA agents did not 
kidnap or detain a single target without substantial evidence.  Scheuer and his successors 
presented evidence through written briefs that cited intelligence information that proved 
that the extraordinary rendition target was a threat to the U.S. or its allies.  If the attorneys 
found the evidence did not persuade them for whatever reason, then the operation ceased, 
pending additional evidence against the target.  Scheuer further said, “let me be very 
explicit and precise on this point.  Not one single al-Qaeda leader has ever been rendered 
on the basis of any CIA officer’s hunch, guess, or caprice.”40 
While the Bush Administration advanced the view that extraordinary rendition 
was the appropriate response to address the urgency for higher security, the creation of 
additional mechanisms to strengthen oversight and accountability would have helped to 
address the current gaps.  President Bush missed a unique opportunity to establish a 
powerful policy to defend national security and establish clear guidelines for the process 
of extraordinary renditions to account for the loopholes in the program.  The 
Administration believed that the best way to preserve national security was to take an ad 
hoc approach and rely on diplomatic assurances to deal with the transfer of terror 
suspects.  While the Administration followed domestic and international law, the 
competing interests between preserving our country’s national security and building 
accountability to safeguard human rights created a rule of law dilemma.  The major rule 
of law controversy centers on human rights concerns and the possibility of torture after 
                                                          
40 Scheuer, supra note 38, at 13. 
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the extraordinary rendition of an individual.  As a result, there is an accountability gap 
because this program creates a procedure that eliminates plausible deniability and places 
extra weight on the obligation not to render a person back to a government that tortures.  
Hence, critics are left questioning who is accountable if a person rendered is, in fact, 
tortured.  
Consequently, opponents of the extraordinary rendition program assert that 
extraordinary rendition harms the fight against terrorism and disrespects human rights.41  
Specifically, “components of the [extraordinary] rendition program, such as secret 
arbitrary detention and torture erode the moral high ground that the United States must 
maintain to defeat terrorism...”42  Extraordinary renditions allow for the transfer of 
individuals to countries with underdeveloped human rights standards.43  Critics of the 
extraordinary rendition program, such as Amnesty International and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), repeatedly attack the extraordinary rendition program for its 
alleged abuses raising moral, judicial, and political allegations.   
According to critics, the extraordinary rendition program’s ultimate goal remains 
to escape the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in order to avoid due process.  In addition, the 
program allows foreign interrogators to extract information by means unavailable to U.S. 
officials.44  To credit these allegations, top officials such as former CIA Inspector 
General Fred Hitz confirmed that extraordinary rendition offers the United States 
                                                          
41 Peter Johnston, Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why all Victims of Extraordinary 
Rendition Need a Cause of Action Against the United States,  16 J.L. & POL’Y 357, 362 
(2007). 
42 Id. 
43 Andrew A. Moher, The Lesser of Two Evils?: An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned 
Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 469, 480 (2004). 
44 Jillian Button, Spirited Away (into a Blackhole?): The Challenge of Invoking State 
Responsibility for Extraordinary Rendition, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 531, 536 (2007). 
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valuable intelligence without proper oversight and accountability.  “We don't do torture, 
and we can't countenance torture in terms of we can't know of it. But if a country offers 
information gleaned from interrogations, we can use the fruits of it.”45  Due to the lack of 
accountability and oversight, the extraordinary rendition program has been termed 
“torture by proxy” and “outsourcing torture.”46  The United States continues to defend 
this program, which “no-one would have dreamt of publicly defending before September 
11.”47  The new paradigm is a strategy that allows for obtaining evidence quickly with 
little emphasis on the individual’s rights.48 
Critics assert that the action of holding and rendering individuals is unprecedented 
and fails to comply with the Constitution.49  Reliance on diplomatic assurances when 
transferring individuals suspected of terrorism to countries with poor human rights 
records is common practice.50  Consequently, many extraordinary renditions take place 
without adequate procedural safeguards.  Even though a high-level executive in February 
2005 defended the extraordinary rendition program, stating that transferred individuals 
will receive humane treatment, opponents remain skeptical.51  Rendered individuals lack 
the ability to challenge their extraordinary rendition or diplomatic assurances to ensure 
that they will be treated justly.52 
                                                          
45 Moher, supra note 43, at 480. 
46 Button, supra note 44, at 537. 
47 Id. 
48 Lalmalani, supra note 1, at 4.  
49 Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terror: Seven Years After 9/11 
History Repeating: Due Process, Torture and Privacy During the War on Terror, 62 SMU 
L. Rev. 3, 4 (2009). 
50 Id. at 10. 
51 Still at Risk, supra note 30, at 74.  
52 Id. at 75. 
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The former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Porter J. Goss testified on 
February 16, 2005, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence defending the 
extraordinary rendition program, but he stated that after a transfer occurs, the United 
States lacks control over whether or not the country has complied with the diplomatic 
assurance.53  Gross stated, “we have a responsibility of trying to ensure that they are 
properly treated, and we try and do the best we can to guarantee that.  But of course once 
they're out of our control, there's only so much we can do.”54  Similarly, Attorney 
General Gonzalez stated, “we can't fully control what that country might do.  We 
obviously expect a country to whom we have rendered a detainee to comply with their 
representations to us.  If you're asking me, 'Does a country always comply?'  I don't have 
an answer to that.”55  Admissions regarding the inability to enforce diplomatic assurances 
after a extraordinary rendition lead opponents to criticize oversight of the program.56  
In an Amnesty International report, Rendition and Secret Detention: A Global 
System of Human Rights Violations, Amnesty argues that extraordinary rendition 
provides an effective means to transfer individuals suspected of terrorism without the 
“red tape.”57  The extraordinary rendition program involves human rights violations 
because most individuals are arrested and detained first illegally.  Amnesty International 
reports that many individuals that are detained and transported to other countries have 
                                                          
53 Id. at 108. 
54 Id. at 109. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 111. 
57 Amnesty International, “Rendition” and Secret Detention: A global system of Human 
Rights violations Questions and Answers 5, POL 30/003/2006. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/db1dbfd1-d468-11dd-8743-
d305bea2b2c7/pol300032006en.pdf. 
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subsequently disappeared.58  Due to the secrecy of the program, Amnesty is unable to 
estimate the program’s scope.  In 2005 Egypt’s Prime Minister reported that 
approximately sixty to seventy detainees had been rendered to Egypt.  The United States 
acknowledged that thirty high-value suspects were captured; however, the location of the 
detainees is unknown.  Further, the report alleges that CIA investigations have led to 
erroneous extraordinary renditions of three-dozen individuals based on confusion of 
names or flawed evidence.59   
According to Amnesty International, the extraordinary rendition program is 
synonymous with a disappearance program and is designed to evade scrutiny by the 
public.60  Extraordinary rendition involves “multiple human rights violations, including 
abduction, arbitrary arrest and detention, and unlawful transfer without due process of 
law.”61  Furthermore, violations occur through the extraordinary rendition program, such 
as the inability of a detainee to challenge his or her detention or transfer to another 
country.  This system is designed to obtain intelligence from detainees without any legal 
restriction or judicial oversight.62  Critics are uncomfortable with extraordinary 
rendition’s transformation from an “extra-legal method of bringing fugitives to an 
otherwise fair trial” to transfers that result in harsh interrogation without enforceable 
diplomatic assurances.63 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is another strong opponent of the 
CIA extraordinary rendition program.  The ACLU states that the extraordinary rendition 
                                                          
58 Id. at 2. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 3. 
61 Id. at 2.  
62 Id. 
63 Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1, 72 (2009).   
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program consists of U.S. run detention facilities where legal safeguards do not apply.  In 
the words of Robert Baer, a former CIA agent, “if you want a serious interrogation, you 
send a prisoner to Jordan.  If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria.  If 
you want someone to disappear -- never to see them again -- you send them to Egypt.”64  
As a result, conceptually, the practice is a “rendition to torture.” 65  The ACLU has 
attempted to obtain records of individuals rendered in 2003 and 2004 through a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request to monitor the treatment of suspects.66  However, the 
Department of Defense (DOD), along with other federal agencies, refused to release the 
records due to their interest in the preservation of national security.67  While the ACLU 
was able to retrieve documents after filing a lawsuit in federal court, this was a small 
victory towards transparency.  Overall, accountability and oversight of the extraordinary 
rendition program is still missing.  
The European Union (EU) Parliamentary Assembly, United Nations (UN) High 
Commission for Human Rights, and other human rights organizations led an investigation 
in June 2006 supporting the allegations that the extraordinary rendition program lacked 
proper oversight.68  According to opponents, the “global war on terrorism” allows for any 
individual to be picked up anywhere and rendered due to the lack of oversight, and 
                                                          
64 ACLU, Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition (2005), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/fact-sheet-extraordinary-rendition. 
65 Jaime A. Baron Rodriguez, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort Statute May Expose 
the United States Government’s Illegal “Extraordinary Rendition” Program through its 
Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 189, 199 (2007). 
66 The Committee on International Human Rights, Torture by Proxy: International and 
Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” 60 The Record 13, 43 (2005). 
67 Id. 
68 Johannes van Aggelen, The Bush Administration's War on Terror: The Consequences 
of Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Its Victims,  
42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 70 (2009).   
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thereby no one is accountable for the disappearance.69  Defeating the terrorist threat 
requires the United States to adopt human rights policies according to human rights 
activists.70  Recently, the International Commission of Jurists have called upon the nation 
to reverse its policies stating that “...torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
secret detentions, abductions, illegal transfers, refoulement, arbitrary, prolonged and 
incommunicado detention, unfair trials, and enforced disappearances - are not legitimate 
responses to the threat of terrorism.  These practices are inconsistent with international 
law and human rights.”71 
Human Rights Watch, another critic of the extraordinary rendition program, is 
troubled by the “unfettered discretion” the Bush Administration holds.72  While the 
executive branch has always had wide discretion in matters of national security, a method 
to monitor the practices of extraordinary renditions is necessary to create transparency, 
accountability, and oversight for the extraordinary rendition program.  Human Rights 
Watch concludes that reliance on diplomatic assurances is not adequate and amounts to 
“empty promises.”73  It maintains the position that the United States can engage in 
extraordinary renditions, but only if the U.S. is certain that the third country receiving the 
suspect will not engage in torture.74 
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Overall, critics argue that extraordinary rendition would not be utilized if due 
diligence applied uniformly to prosecute and punish individuals suspected of criminal 
activity such as terrorism.  The reality, though, remains that “U.S. federal law 
enforcement agents are faced with the difficult choice of either following customary 
extradition treaty and taking the chance that the terrorist or drug traffickers will avoid 
prosecution of their crimes or bypassing traditional legal channels by obtaining custody 
of fugitives through irregular rendition.”75 
In addition to the choice that law enforcement officials are faced with, legal 
channels indicate that extraordinary rendition is an appropriate tool for self-defense.  
Article 21 adopted by the International Law Commission states that “the wrongfulness of 
an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defense taken 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”76  In addition, Article 51 of the 
UN Charter endorses self-defense by asserting that states can protect themselves and use 
force against an armed attack.  However, there is debate regarding the U.S. interpretation 
of self-defense and its justification for extraordinary renditions.  International law states 
that self-defense is just and is the “only unambiguously legitimate justification for the use 
of force.”77  To defend against a credible threat through a preventative war defeats a 
pursuit of peace and reconciliation, which the international community argues is the right 
criterion to engage in war.  Critics in the international community further argue that states 
are using war too quickly and defending their decisions as a method of self-preservation 
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without attempting to use mediation and diplomacy.78  As a result, democracy and human 
rights suffers because the U.S. defends a broad use of self-defense to engage in practices 
such as extraordinary rendition.79 
However, supporters of extraordinary rendition argue that the self-defense model 
serves to maintain the new balance in the post-9/11 world between human rights and the 
new security threat.80  General Philip Heymann, Harvard law professor and former 
Deputy Attorney General, justifies extraordinary renditions by stating: 
The United States can reap the benefits of these activities, forbidden by 
international human rights conventions . . . if we attempt to export the 
counterterrorism costs of extensive searches, electronic surveillance, 
coercive interrogation, and limitations on association, detention, and 
speech.  Each of these measures, controlled or forbidden by the United 
States Constitution, are likely to be promising ways of obtaining needed 
information about terrorists’ plans and of otherwise preventing terrorist 
initiatives.81  
 
Further, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice supported extraordinary rendition by 
stating, “[Extraordinary] renditions take terrorists out of action, and saves lives.  In 
conducting such renditions, it is the policy of the United States, and I presume of any 
other democracies who uses this procedure, to comply with its laws.”82  The Bush 
Administration argued that extraordinary rendition is a vital counterterrorism tool to fight 
terrorism and disrupt terrorist activities; this program has led to confessions and 
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dismantled plots by rendering key individuals to a foreign state.83  Much of the public 
discussion regarding extraordinary rendition was asserted as a policy for protection the 
United States; however the evidence or details of the program remained classified due to 
its detrimental effect on national security.  Ultimately, the necessity of the situation may 
require the United States to engage in extraordinary renditions to protect national 
security, which may undermine the U.S. commitment to the rule of law and its own 
foundational commitment to humanity, unless stronger mechanisms are created to ensure 
accountability. 
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Part Three: Rule of Law Analysis 
Constitutionally, President Bush and his Administration defended the expansion 
of extraordinary rendition as an appropriate response to terrorism by relying on his 
inherent executive authority post-9/11.84  Yoo described these powers in a memorandum 
for the United States Justice Department as Presidential war making powers and stated 
that the President has inherent authority to use force against terrorists.85  This authority, 
in his view, comes from the history and the text of the U.S. Constitution.  The President 
is entrusted with the responsibility to use military force during emergency situations.86  
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution explicitly states that the “President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”87  The 
Constitution vested the President with broad authority to respond to military threats to 
national security and foreign policy by using military force.88  Further, the President has 
the executive power to implement the laws.89  Therefore, the President may “dispose of 
the liberty of captured enemy personnel as he sees fit.”90  Based on this analysis, whether 
the U.S. is complying with the rule of law is determined by a pivotal question – whether 
or not the United States is at war.  Before the declaration of war, the United States abides 
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by statutes and treaties, but once war is declared, the President trumps the law.91  As a 
result, executive-made laws reign.  Yoo asserts, “this is not to say that these 
[extraordinary renditions] are wholly ungoverned by law.  It is only to make clear that 
these transfers are governed by a different set of rules - the laws of war - than those that 
apply in domestic, peacetime affairs.”92  
President Bush defended the shift in U.S. policy and the increased use of 
extraordinary renditions stating, “that the attack on American sovereignty undermined 
both the security and the way of life of the American people, and therefore America was 
entitled to defend itself using virtually any means necessary.”93  While the President may 
rely on his inherent authority to approve extraordinary renditions, oversight mechanisms 
exist to ensure these transfers conform to the rule of law.  Congress asserted statutory 
control over covert operations such as extraordinary renditions in 1974 by passing the 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.94  The Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment required that appropriated funds could not be used for CIA covert actions 
without Presidential approval and a national security concern.95  The Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment standardized the issuance of covert actions such as extraordinary renditions 
by requiring a Presidential finding; this consisted of a signed document by the President 
discussing the operation and all parties involved.96  Congressional oversight committees 
received notification of extraordinary renditions immediately thereafter.  After receiving 
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notice, Congress could either approve the action or prohibit the activity by denying 
funds.97  The notice action timing was crucial for oversight.  In its totality the 
Amendment did not provide clarity for the process of covert actions and failed to 
recognize the sustainability of executive actions despite zero congressional funding.  
However, the Amendment suggested a framework for the creation of jurisdiction for 
congressional committees to oversee intelligence activities such as the extraordinary 
rendition program.98  Most importantly, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment precluded 
deniability of a President’s knowledge of operations such as extraordinary renditions and 
laid the foundation for executive accountability.99  As a result, the Amendment assigned 
responsibility to the President for all covert actions, and a total of eight committees 
received notification.100  
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment forged major changes in the relationship between 
the CIA and Congress by enabling intelligence committees to review covert actions such 
as extraordinary renditions.101  However, Congress recognized that in order for the 
execution of successful covert operations, secrecy was paramount.  To enhance 
operational efficiency and maintain transparency, Congress passed the Intelligence 
Accountability Act, also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.102  This Act 
reduced the reporting requirement from eight different committees to only the 
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intelligence oversight committees, thereby increasing secrecy and efficiency.103  The Act 
provided for two new congressional intelligence committees, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (House Intelligence Committee) and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (Senate Intelligence Committee), with the statutory 
framework for oversight for acts such as extraordinary rendition.104  Congress ordered the 
CIA and other intelligence agencies under congressional appropriation and authorization 
for the first time.105  Further, Congress amended the new law and added Section 501.  
This section authorized the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), all heads of the 
departments and agencies, and entities involved in intelligence to remain “fully and 
currently informed of all intelligence activities...engaged in by, or are carried out for or 
on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States, including any 
significant anticipated intelligence activity” to report to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees.106  Also, the Act provided that the DCI must report “any illegal 
intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure” in a “timely fashion.”107  The 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment was simultaneously amended to incorporate Section 501.  
Therefore, the DCI had a duty to report covert activities, such as extraordinary renditions, 
to the intelligence committees.  Further, “fully and currently informed” meant that the 
oversight committees be informed when the President authorizes initiation of any covert 
activity.108  
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In addition, Section 501 stated two exceptions pertinent to the written notification 
to congressional committees that affect extraordinary rendition.  First, notice may be 
limited when the “President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet 
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States.”109  Section 501 
states that on such a finding, notice is limited to the intelligence committee’s chairman 
and ranking member, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority 
and minority leader.110  While the executive branch may limit disclosure in certain cases, 
there is still a requirement to report routine covert actions to the intelligence committees.  
Second, Daniel Silver, CIA General Counsel, stated that oversight committees should 
have reports of anticipated or significant actions, subject to the President’s authority in 
exceptional cases.111  Silver stated, “in what I would expect to be highly unusual cases, 
the President may act in the exercise of his constitutional authority or in rare 
circumstances, under the second preambular phrase, and not give prior notice to anyone 
in the Congress”112 While members of Congress disagreed, stating that constitutional 
duties may not be altered, Congress chose not to challenge this understanding.  Instead, 
Congress added section 501(b) stating: “The President shall fully inform the intelligence 
committees in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than 
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was 
not given under subsection (a) of this section and shall provide a statement of the reasons 
for not giving prior notice.”113  Therefore, in rare circumstances such as extraordinary 
rendition, the President may withhold information prior to a transfer; however, he or she 
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must inform the two oversight committees of the reason(s) for failure to provide timely 
notice.114 
Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991, reinforcing the 
President’s power to authorize covert activity, such as extraordinary renditions, on the 
premise that it is necessary for an identifiable national security objective.115  The 
legislation had the same requirement as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment including a 
finding reported to Congress in writing before the authorization of any covert action; and 
a written record of the President’s decision must be made “contemporaneously” and in 
writing within forty-eight hours if time does not permit preparation of the finding in 
writing.116  Further, the finding may not authorize activities that have already occurred, 
unless there is an exceptional circumstance.  All U.S. entities and third parties receiving 
funds or participating must be identified, and finally, violation of the Constitution will 
result in the denial of an authorization.  
Equipped with congressional authorization, the Bush Administration claimed that 
federal courts lacked the authority and competence to review habeas claims of detainees, 
thereby reducing their constitutional jurisdiction.117  The effect of this argument reduces 
the authority of the judicial branch as it is written in Article III, Section II of the 
Constitution, which states that judicial authority branch shall extend to “controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party.”118  The Administration argued “respect for 
separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of 
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military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict” ought to eliminate 
entirely any individual process, thus restricting the court’s involvement. 119  The Bush 
Administration asserted that the judicial branch should not review Presidential 
designations that have legal authorization.  Based on this viewpoint, the President was 
not required to specify charges against an individual, which resulted in a lack of oversight 
and accountability of the extraordinary rendition program.120  While the President has the 
plenary authority of the commander in chief powers under Article II, Section 2 to render 
individuals, circumstances have arisen where the individual was tortured in violation of 
the Convention against Torture.  As a result, extraordinary renditions create 
accountability and oversight gaps that fail to meet the rule of law standards.   
While the Supreme Court has not specifically indicated that extraordinary 
renditions require stronger oversight and accountability mechanisms, the Court has 
addressed the need for regulation and accountability in detention cases that provide 
possible solutions to address the loopholes in extraordinary renditions.  In response to the 
President’s overreaching claim of inherent authority, the judicial branch reinforced its 
authority under Article III by giving deference to Presidential decisions during war, but 
limiting his or her authority to uphold the rule of law with unanimity in detention cases.  
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the role of the judiciary and its intent to 
preserve the separation of powers in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, holding that all three branches of government must be 
involved to provide adequate protection of the rule of law.121  While detention differs 
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from extraordinary rendition because it results in the transfer of individuals to centers 
under U.S. control, the substance of these decisions may be applied to extraordinary 
rendition.  The Court signals that authority, oversight, and accountability must be 
maintained during the War on Terror.  While clear authority through congressional 
authorization and the President’s inherent authority exist for extraordinary renditions, the 
findings may provide solutions to increase accountability and oversight when suspects 
are transferred to foreign countries where the United States does not have control, but the 
possibility of torture exists.   
In a fractured decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court established that the 
executive branch does not have a “blank check,” and the powers within the Constitution 
“envisions a role of all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”122  The 
President has the authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks...in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism” based 
on congressional authorization through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) Law against Terrorists.123  However, the Court held that the Constitution 
envisions active participation of all three branches of government in dire times, rather 
than power concentrated in a single branch of government.124   
The Hamdi decision resulted in the creation of accountability and oversight of 
detention by providing an American citizen designated as an enemy combatant an 
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opportunity to contest his status in the presence of a fair decision maker.125  The Court 
held that the executive’s classifications and detentions are not presumed correct without 
an opportunity for the individual to challenge the evidence to ensure the process is 
constitutional.126  To provide oversight of detentions in a manner that simultaneously 
protects national security, the Court recognized that civilian courts are not the only courts 
that dispense due process.127  The plurality opinion stated that it was proper for Hamdi to 
challenge his detention before a United States federal state also known as an Article III 
court.  This challenge through a writ of habeas corpus would allow for procedural 
protections, such as an opportunity to present and rebut facts.128  The Court 
acknowledged that hearsay and the burden of proof was in favor of the government.  
Lastly, the Court agreed that the President had the authority granted by the Constitution 
and congressional authorization through the AUMF to detain Hamdi.129  The Court held 
that the capture and detention of combatants are important incidents of war; however, 
indefinite detention was not permitted based on the AUMF or the Geneva 
Conventions.130   
Hamdi does not directly apply to extraordinary rendition because detention was 
an incident of war and congressionally authorized through the AUMF.  Extraordinary 
renditions, on the other hand, occur through the detention of an individual who may or 
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may not be deemed an illegal enemy combatant before transferring him or her to a 
foreign state for the purposes of detention, interrogation, or trial.  While the President has 
the authority to rely solely on his inherent authority to render individuals to third 
countries, there are concerns that the individual might face torture.131  While the Court 
recognized that there is an urgency to detain an individual on the battlefield, they still 
maintained that “any process in which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly 
unchallenged… falls constitutionally short.”132  In the case of extraordinary renditions, 
the government already has the suspect in custody, and, therefore, a stronger case for 
some sort of process should apply to provide for oversight.  Hamdi suggests that transfers 
do not require a formal civilian trial and full application of the rules of evidence; 
however, at a minimum the decision mandates independent review to comply with the 
Constitution.133  Hamdi signals that the process of judicial review can help enhance 
transparency and accountability before an extraordinary rendition occurs.   
Rasul further solidified the notion that the United States must maintain 
constitutional standards and balances of power during operations abroad.134  In response 
to the judicial branch’s maneuver to provide oversight of detentions, the government 
argued that detainees labeled as unlawful combatants were denied protections of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and, therefore, outside the laws of war.135  
However, the Court held that individuals held at Guantanamo indefinitely were still 
entitled to due process.  Prior to Rasul, the prisoners detained at Guantanamo endured 
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indefinite detainment without transparent procedural protection.136  After the Hamdi and 
Rasul decisions, the Bush Administration created an ad hoc system that provided for 
oversight and accountability by granting individuals minimum process.  
Hamdan once again addressed issues of separation of powers and the rule of law.  
The Court held that the President could not create military commissions by executive 
order that departs from the procedures enacted by Congress.137  The President must 
comply with the rule of law, and designated enemy combatants require trial via “a 
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees as indispensable by 
civilized people.”138  While the Court acknowledged that expedited judicial review is 
justified in times of war, the majority was concerned with the President’s lack of 
consultation with Congress regarding whether Hamdan possessed any rights.139  In the 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that trial via military commission raised 
separation of powers concerns.  It concentrated power in the executive branch by 
“plac[ing] personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the 
Constitution's three-part system is designed to avoid.”140  It is imperative that full and 
proper authority exists for the Presidential directive to establish military tribunals.  The 
broader implication of this ruling signifies that it does not matter how the President labels 
an individual or where the conflict occurs; the Constitution mandates oversight and 
accountability of detentions.141   
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In a reciprocal response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act in October 2006, requiring military commissions to meet the requisite standard set 
forth by Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.  On July 20, 2007, President Bush issued an 
executive order stating that Common Article 3, prohibiting “violence, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture,” and “humiliating and degrading treatment”, applied to the CIA.142  
In terms of extraordinary rendition, once again the underlying message in Hamdan 
signifies that a detainee should receive minimum process to ensure accountability and 
oversight before his transfer to a foreign state in compliance with the Geneva 
Convention. 
The Supreme Court continued to preserve the separation of powers and demanded 
an explanation for detentions of individuals.143  The Court addressed extraordinary 
rendition cases in a more direct manner in Boumediene, holding that “the political 
branches [do not] have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will” by moving 
individuals to “law-free zones.”144  The Supreme Court took a functional approach and 
applied an “objective degree of control” test.145  Based on this test, the Court provided 
that protections for detainees in Guantanamo included a need for habeas review.  The 
Supreme Court had the option to limit the ruling in Boumediene by strictly applying it to 
Guantanamo Bay detainees; however, the Court used the “objective degree of control,” 
which has broader implications for U.S. actions such as extraordinary renditions.146  In 
the lens of Boumediene, when the executive branch authorizes the extraordinary rendition 
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of an individual, the U.S. in effect maintains an “objective degree of control”, and 
therefore, the process may require habeas corpus before the transfer.147  
The combination of the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and 
Boumediene provide signals that the Supreme Court requires accountability and 
oversight, even when the executive branch has the authority through inherent powers and 
congressional authorization to render individuals to third countries.148  While 
extraordinary rendition is a different process because the President possesses the inherent 
authority to approve such covert actions in addition to congressional approval via the 
AUMF, the transfers must still comply with the rule of law.  A gap exists regarding the 
degree of accountability the President and Congress hold after an individual is rendered 
to a foreign government where he or she may face torture.  The decisions in Hamdi, 
Rasul, Hamdan and Boumediene manifest the Court’s intent to ensure that the doctrine of 
separation of powers is upheld, even during times of national emergency.  The Court’s 
holdings suggest that Article III courts may be appropriate to provide due process.  
Further, a system independent from the existing courts based on the President’s war 
powers, though appropriate, is still subject to some habeas corpus review.  Extending the 
principles in detention cases, the Court provided possible solutions for oversight and 
accountability for extraordinary rendition.   
In response to providing for oversight for extraordinary renditions, the President 
looked towards the states secret doctrine as an alternative means to provide judicial 
review while simultaneously protecting national security.  The states secret doctrine 
preserved secrecy by restricting intelligence access to members of the executive branch, 
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but at the same time implementing procedural due process as required by the prior rulings 
of the Supreme Court.  The states secret doctrine balanced the President’s autonomy with 
providing rendered suspects process.  This is not a new paradigm introduced by the Bush 
Administration, but, rather, it has existed since the beginning of the Republic.149  The 
state secret privilege allows the government to deny the release of certain evidence that 
can potentially endanger national security.150  The doctrine serves as a constitutional 
protection of “information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs 
responsibilities.”151  Without the protection of the executive branch against litigation, the 
U.S. might suffer detriment regarding foreign affairs and the security of its citizens.152  
Therefore, the Supreme Court has historically recognized the constitutional necessity of 
the state secret doctrine and deferred to the executive branch.153 
Totten v. United States first asserted the rule that barred judicial review of claims 
against the United States based on the existence of a secret agreement of espionage.154  
This is a Civil War case involving a Union Spy.  The plaintiff brought suit against the 
government on behalf of the estate of William A. Lloyd alleging that an agreement 
existed between Lloyd and President Lincoln to spy on the Confederacy.  The Supreme 
Court held that the President under the commander in chief powers had the authority to 
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enter agreements during time of war.  The Court ruled to preserve the secrecy of these 
agreements by holding that disclosure of the secret agreement would either compromise 
or embarrass the government.  The holding of the Court thereby acknowledged the state 
secrets privilege.155  
Thirty-seven years later, Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. [1912], 
expanded the state secret privilege by “encompass[ing] the power of a court to actively 
preclude certain testimony rather than merely allowing a party claiming the privilege to 
refrain from answering.”156  In that case, the plaintiff initiated an infringement action 
after the defendant unlawfully tried to obtain copies of secret drawings of armour-
piercing projectiles for a patent.  The court held that the information in the drawing 
existed as confidential government information and must be excluded for public policy 
reasons.157  “This exclusion on the basis of policy reasons which attached to the 
documents on account of their subject matter marked a unique shift away from the other 
historical privileges which generally arose out of some form of personal relationship.”158  
In addition, United States v. Reynolds [1952] further placed matters of national security 
and the country’s safety before the interest of a few citizens during the Cold War.  Three 
families brought a tort action against the United States for the death of their spouses in a 
military crash.  During military testing of secret electronic equipment by the civilians, a 
fire broke out killing three out of the four civilians.  The government refused both the 
Plaintiff’s and District Court’s release of the Air Force accident investigation report and 
any statements made by the survivors due to highly secret military equipment and 
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national security concerns.  On appeal, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a 
favorable ruling holding that the state secrets privilege remained valid under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 which permitted the government to refuse privileged 
information.159 
The state secrets privilege is founded on English precedent in Duncan v. Cammel, 
Laird & Co [1942].  When considering how courts should deal with the state secrets 
privilege the House of Lords held that: 
The court must treat the decision of the non-judicial official as 
‘conclusive’...that it is not proper for a judge to inspect the documentation 
to determine if the public interest requires its exclusion, but rather that the 
privilege must be asserted in such a manner to satisfy the judge that the 
proper executive department head has seen and reviewed the 
information.160  
 
Even though there is debate that the decision reached in Duncan is not correct, the 
Supreme Court established the common law interpretation of the state secret doctrine 
based on the precedent set-forth in Duncan.  As a result, the Supreme Court permitted the 
government to without privileged information.  The Supreme Court viewed the state 
secrets privilege under the law of evidence.  The government must assert the privilege 
and it should not be lightly invoked.  After the privilege is asserted, the court finally rules 
whether the privilege is necessary.  The difficulty when assessing the state secrets 
privilege is determining whether the privilege exists without disclosure of the privileged 
information.  The Court analogized the state secrets privilege with self-incrimination 
stating, “some formula of compromise should be developed and applied in the state secret 
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context.”161  The Reynolds court held that when determining the balance between full 
disclosure of evidence with accepting the state secret’s privilege on face value, disclosure 
is not a requirement of the court.162  The Court reasoned that the government should not 
automatically be required to disclose information that is ex parte and in camera even to 
the judge who is making the privilege assessment.163  Due to the danger of exposing 
national security information and military secrets, disclosure of such material is not 
required.  Based on this assessment, the Court held that disclosure of information by the 
government to a judge is not necessary; however, the government must demonstrate a 
necessity to invoke the privilege.  
The judiciary grants the executive branch a high level of deference to exercise this 
privilege.164  However, without reforms the privilege holds the potential to violate legal 
and constitutional rights if the evidence is not subjected to judicial scrutiny.165  The 
Supreme Court stated that the privilege cannot be given to the officials without judicial 
control; however, the standards set forth in Reynolds for the level of review for lower 
courts to measure what constitutes a state secret remains ambiguous.166  The Supreme 
Court allowed the lower courts to rule with little consistency by providing an unclear 
standard:  
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Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the 
caprice of executive officers.  Yet we will not go so far as to say that the 
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before 
the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case.  It may be possible to 
satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military 
matters, which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.  
When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the 
court should not jeopardize the security, which the privilege is meant to 
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the 
judge alone, in chambers.167  
 
This ruling is unclear because the Supreme Court does not describe the specific types of 
information that qualify as a “state secret” or explain the assertion of this privilege within 
the constructs of the law.  Consequently, lower courts rule with little consistently as to 
what constitutes a state secret.  When this privilege is exercised with absolute deference 
by judges, it reduces the public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary.  As a result, 
despite announcements that there is absolute deference to the executive branch, courts 
maintain that they review what information the privilege is trying to shield and whether 
the claim is proper when they determine whether the state secrets doctrine applies.168  
The Supreme Court deferred to the authority of the executive branch in El-Masri 
v. Tenet and Arar v. Ashcroft.169  In both cases the use of the extraordinary rendition 
program allowed for the transfer of both suspects to another country.  El-Masri and Arar 
both alleged the U.S. violated their human rights by mistaking them as terrorists, 
rendering them to a foreign state, and then torturing them.170  The government moved for 
summary judgment and dismissal on state secret grounds.  In El-Masri, Judge T.S. Ellis 
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stated, “courts must not blindly accept the Executive Branch’s assertion...but must 
independently and carefully determine...[whether] the claimed secrets deserve the 
protection of the privilege.”171  According to Judge Ellis, the courts must determine 
whether the U.S. possesses adequate evidence to assert the privilege.  However, Ellis also 
noted “the courts must bear in mind the Executive Branch’s preeminent authority over 
military and diplomatic matters and its greater expertise relative to the judicial branch in 
predicating the effect of a particular disclosure of national security.”172  The court 
addressed concerns of the overuse of the state secret’s doctrine without judicial scrutiny 
by recognizing that the government has the burden to prove the doctrine’s 
applicability.173   
El-Masri believed that the executive’s state secret privilege should not extend to 
the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program and argued that litigation would have no 
consequence to national security because the program has been widely discussed.  He 
suggested special procedures to protect any sensitive information during discovery.174  
However, the court held that if they proceeded in a civil action, exposure of sensitive 
information remained a strong possibility, specifically, “the roles the defendants played 
in the events and, thus, in the CIA organization, and…how the CIA organizes and 
supervises its intelligence and operations.”175  Furthermore, without the privileged 
evidence, the defendants would be unable to defend themselves: “Virtually any 
conceivable response to El-Masri's allegations would disclose privileged information.”176  
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Therefore, dismissal served as an appropriate remedy because the circumstances made it 
clear that litigation would threaten privileged information.177  
In Arar, the court once again deferred to the authority of the state secret privilege 
and dismissed his claims because they lacked standing, “given the national security and 
foreign policy considerations at stake.”178  The Second Circuit affirmed the decision 
based on the Supreme Court’s indication that national security is “an arena of executive 
action in which courts remain hesitant to intrude” further, “a reminder of the undisputed 
fact that claims under consideration involve significant national security decisions made 
in consultation with several foreign powers.”179 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to review extraordinary rendition cases raises 
questions as to whether or not courts are willing to insert themselves in executive matters.  
Many legal scholars argue that the Supreme Court avoids cases when foreign policy 
issues arise and may recuse itself by stating that the issue is a political question and 
therefore nonjusticiable.180  The rationale to side-step questions of foreign policy is based 
on the fact that legal interference of a political question “delegitimizes the Court and 
possibly tips the balance of power inappropriately toward the judicial branch.”181  
However, opponents of this view assert that the Supreme Court has repeatedly issued 
opinions and while some provide support for the executive branch, the Court has also 
ruled against it when addressing foreign policy.  They argue that there are two different 
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scenarios where the Supreme Court considers the constitutional claim of authority and 
issues an opinion.  In the first scenario, the President is within his strongest claim of 
authority based on Article II powers, the Supreme Court advances the view that the 
Constitution must be read with discretion in matters of foreign affairs, but more often 
than not the court has upheld the President’s claim.  In the first instance, the Court 
accepts the President’s policy decision because the “legislature's rubber stamp” of 
approval.182  In the second, scenario the court is faced with a “gray zone” because the 
President’s powers are not expressly permitted or denied.  Consequently, the Court 
exercises greater discretion to circumvent the executive’s authority.  Therefore, in 
instances when civil liberties are at stake and authority is ambiguous the Court has 
asserted itself as the guardian of rights and ruled against the executive branch.  Applied to 
extraordinary rendition, the Court is likely to intervene to provide checks and balances 
because the President’s authority is ambiguous and civil liberties are at stake.183   
While the Supreme Court provided review in the cases of Arar and El-Masri, the 
Court remained reluctant to rule on the legality of the extraordinary rendition program.  
The President’s reliance on inherent constitutional powers is legal, and courts are 
providing quasi-review for extraordinary renditions like the cases in Arar and El-Masri, 
the harder analysis remains whether the use of extraordinary rendition conforms to 
international law.  Arar and El-Masri both illustrate that there is a need to provide a 
balance between national security and human rights.  The United States holds the dual 
responsibility of protecting its citizens from terrorist attacks and maintaining a good 
human rights record.  Most attacks regarding the extraordinary rendition program are 
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focused on the illegality under international law.184  The U.N. Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), U.S. domestic 
implementation of the CAT, and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998 (FARRA) provides the legal framework for the extraordinary rendition of 
individuals to third countries.185  Both pieces of legislation generally ban extraordinary 
rendition of individuals to third countries where they will more likely than not be 
tortured.186   
The international community’s commitment to prohibit torture has existed since 
World War II through treaties and declarations.187  Torture is a violation of human rights 
and the universal laws of nations.  Further, under international law torture is prohibited 
during the transfer of an individual to a foreign state.188  Therefore, the United Nations 
adopted the CAT on December 10, 1984, which provides restrictions on transfers where 
there is a substantial likelihood that the individual will face torture.  The CAT 
specifically prohibits the infliction of severe physical or mental suffering under the color 
of law.189  The CAT’s primary objective is the prohibition of torture and requires 
signatory nations to enact and enforce criminal laws against torture.190  The United States 
ratified the CAT in 1994 and articulated that Articles One through Sixteen of the 
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Convention under U.S. domestic law was not self-executing.191  In 1998 Congress passed 
FARRA, which implemented Article 3 of the CAT’s prohibitions on torture and 
refoulement.  Section 2242 of FARRA states that the U.S. could not “expel, extradite, or 
otherwise affect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.”192  
The Bush Administration’s interpretation of torture has led to controversies 
surrounding the extraordinary rendition program.  The Administration maintained that 
extraordinary renditions follow a legal standard and comply with the CAT.  First, the 
Administration argued that the United States does not condone torture, nor does it 
transport individuals from one country to another for purposes of torture.  The focal point 
of the Administration’s argument is “purpose.”193  The purpose of the extraordinary 
rendition program is not torture, but, rather, to obtain intelligence.194  
Second, the legal analysis of what constitutes torture is instrumental for 
supporting the argument that the extraordinary rendition program abides by the rule of 
law.  The United States considered the obligation not to torture under Article 16 of the 
CAT to prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” as the Fifth, 
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution define it.195  
The Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, and Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee authored (and subsequently disavowed) a controversial memorandum addressing 
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torture on August 1, 2002.196  The memo described the legal standard for conduct during 
interrogations and asserted that the Administration was in compliance with the CAT 
under 18 U.S.C. sections 2340-2340A.197  Under section 2340 for an act to constitute 
torture, “it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure.”198  Consequently, the Bybee 
memo stated that torture was confined to egregious acts producing physical pain, which 
must be “equivalent in intensity to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as 
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”199  The memo determined 
that the statute, interpreted as a whole, only prohibits extreme acts.  As a result there was 
a “significant range of acts that might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment [that] fail to rise to the level of torture.”200   
Congress ratified the CAT defining torture as “an act committed by a person 
acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering...upon another person within his custody or physical control.”201  Critics 
argue that the implementation of this definition is contrary to the CAT, which requires 
only a general intent requirement.  By allowing specific intent, an act that may be 
considered cruel, inhuman, or degrading is legally permitted if the actor only had general 
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intent.  However, the DOD Working Group Report (WGR) supported the legal analysis 
of the Bybee memo and subsequently issued a report in April 2003.  The DOD argued 
that torture under the CAT must be pain inflicted upon an individual “of such a high level 
of intensity that the pain is difficult . . . to endure.”202  As a result both departments held 
the view that cruel and unusual punishment, which does not amount to the level of 
severity indicated, is not torture under criminal law in the United States.   
The Bybee memo and the WGR received harsh criticism from opponents, mainly 
because the definition of torture was so narrow and failed to comply with international 
standards.  Many opponents of the Bybee memo, such as the State Department, argued 
that this was legally and morally damaging to our national interest.  The memo ignored 
and misunderstood U.S. obligations to prohibit torture and cruel and inhuman treatment 
as described by the CAT.203  Opponents argue that the narrow definition of torture allows 
for poor oversight.  As a result the United States can resist responsibility if torture exists 
after the extraordinary rendition of an individual to a foreign country.204  The United 
States can render individuals to foreign countries and enjoy the “fruits of information 
gathered,” while simultaneously having no “direct knowledge of the host country's 
interrogation methods.”205  As a result opponents categorize the extraordinary rendition 
program as the U.S. program of outsourcing torture.206    
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To address the oversight and accountability gaps, the United States allows for the 
consideration of diplomatic assurances from third countries in extraordinary rendition 
decisions pursuant to the CAT.  Specifically, Article 3 governs extraordinary rendition by 
establishing the requirement that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture 
shall be considered.”207  Furthermore “competent authorities shall take into account . . . 
the existence … of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights.”208  Based on Article 3, an individual subject to extraordinary rendition may be 
transferred to a foreign state provided that the Secretary of State reviews all evidence and 
receives “sufficiently reliable” assurances that the individual will not be tortured.  
According to the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, to comply with this 
standard, CAT protections assert that these assurances must be greater than a mere 
suspicion that the rendered individual will not be subject to torture; however, it does 
necessitate raising the standard to a high probability.209  An attorney for the Department 
of Justice, Martin Lederman, asserts that “[The CAT] only applies when you know a 
suspect is more likely than not to be tortured, but what if you kind of know? That’s 
enough.  So there is no way around it.”210  Therefore, when the U.S. receives a reliable 
assurance that an individual will not be tortured, initially an inherent violation of the 
CAT or its domestic legislation does not exist.211  The interpretation of the “more likely 
than not” standard is not an invention of the Bush Administration; rather, this precedent 
was adopted by the Senate in 1990 and then ratified in 1994.  This standard is used 
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commonly in the U.S. justice system when courts make a determination whether to 
withhold an individual’s removal based on fear of persecution.212  
There are several criticisms that the U.S. practice of obtaining diplomatic 
assurances undermines international law.  Critics assert the transfer of individuals to 
states with poor human rights record coupled with the secrecy of assurances renders them 
unreliable.  The responsibility of the United States to ensure its compliance with the CAT 
does not diminish after an extraordinary rendition.  Many times the transfer occurs even 
when the receiving country may have a questionable human rights record.213  These 
concerns are raised not only by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, but the U.S. State 
Department as well.  After the extraordinary rendition of a suspect, it remains difficult to 
monitor the assurance: “Torture is conducted in secret and regimes that use torture have 
become adept at hiding it.”214  As a result there is a possibility that diplomatic assurances 
may just be a rubber stamp in complying with the CAT.  Article 3 of the CAT does not 
provide guidance regarding what standards govern a diplomatic assurance and what 
considerations lead to the determination that an individual should be rendered.  In 
addition there is no documentation available that provides insight on the legal evaluation 
of diplomatic assurances.215 
While criticisms from groups like Amnesty and the ACLU exist, the use of 
diplomatic assurances creates a system of accountability that places additional oversight 
to uphold the rule of law and serves as a vehicle for the U.S. to ensure that the foreign 
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state will not engage in torture.  The U.S. determines whether “this particular individual 
is more likely than not to be tortured if we send them back.  And that is where the 
diplomatic assurances come into play.  If the country has a bad human rights record, there 
is immediately going to be a yellow light about whether we would send someone 
back.”216  As a result diplomatic assurances are used in an ad hoc manner based upon a 
number of factors including: the identity of the individual providing the assurance; the 
use of torture within the military, prison, or criminal justice system of the receiving state; 
the willingness of the country to abide by the CAT; and the priority the foreign state 
places on maintaining bilateral relations with the United States.217  The use of diplomatic 
assurances is a sign that the U.S. is committed to its obligations under the CAT.  
Diplomatic assurances can reduce the risk of torture when an individual is transferred 
based on Article 3 of the CAT because the U.S. has direct contact with top-level officials 
from foreign governments regarding the extraordinary rendition.218  Further, in many 
cases according to John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, after 
an extraordinary rendition, the U.S. continues to pursue reports and take necessary action 
when assurances are not upheld by the receiving state.219  
While U.S. policy dictates that an individual will not be rendered to a country if 
he or she may be subject to torture, the applicability of Article 3 is limited.  Human rights 
treaties, such as the CAT, “apply to persons living in the territory of the United States, 
and not to any person with whom agents of our government deal in the international 
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community.”220  The U.S. State Department confirmed this analysis stating that the CAT 
Article 3 does not apply to individuals outside U.S. jurisdiction; however, the State 
Department indicated that transfers of individuals are guided by the policy of the CAT.  
Opponents of this view contend that a narrow interpretation of Article 3 diminishes the 
goal to prevent torture.  In response the U.S. maintains that Article 3 of the CAT does not 
have reach outside the U.S., and this analysis is supported by the rest of the CAT, the 
negotiation history of the treaty, and the U.S. Record of Ratification.221  While there is an 
inherent law-policy split, the U.S. maintains that it follows the policy of Article 3 of the 
CAT.  This is evidenced by the fact extraordinary renditions are not an expedited process 
because the U.S. must first ensure that a reliable assurance exists.222  Lastly, the U.S. 
adheres to its commitment to Article 3 of the CAT and maintains that an individual will 
not be transferred based on “any kind of balancing of interests, or harms, even in cases 
involving the possible removal…of an individual who may pose a threat to the safety and 
security of the American people.”223 
The concept of diplomatic assurances for extraordinary rendition and assurance of 
due process, however, appears to be a toothless vehicle.  Nonetheless, the United States 
seeks to enforce these assurances because no better alternatives exist under FARRA, U.S. 
immigration laws, and international laws.224  The use of diplomatic assurances is 
important to guard the United States’ national security and public safety interests.225  If an 
individual is suspected of terrorism, the United States does not want the suspect within its 
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borders posing a threat to U.S. citizens.  Additionally, the United States cannot imprison 
the suspect because he or she will eventually be released back into the country.  Also, no 
possibility exists for indefinite detention within the United States because this policy 
would offend the 6th amendment and due process. As a result the best alternative to 
maintain national security is to seek diplomatic assurances from another country and 
render the individual.  However, measures to strengthen assurances will alleviate human 
rights concerns and strengthen accountability.  Currently, the lack of responsibility after 
an extraordinary rendition raises concerns even though the United States appears to 
adhere to domestic and international laws by receiving diplomatic assurances.  
Consequently, raising the bar when an individual is rendered, as described below, based 
on the human rights record of the foreign state will increase oversight and accountability. 
To mitigate the risk of torture and strengthen U.S. compliance with the rule of 
law, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the CAT, 
provides additional oversight mechanisms that will strengthen accountability.  The 
Committee has three requirements governing assurances that serve as an instructive guide 
for extraordinary renditions.  Assurances must have clear and established procedures, 
must be subject to judicial review, and must ensure post-transfer monitoring of the 
individual.  Currently the U.S. approach for ensuring that individuals rendered will not be 
subject to torture does not meet the entire procedural threshold of the CAT due to the lack 
of oversight post-extraordinary rendition.226  To effectively remedy this gap and reduce 
the risk of torture, the United States should create a formalized procedure that raises the 
legal requirements before an extraordinary rendition and insist that an individual is only 
rendered to a foreign country that does not systemically violate the CAT.  After an 
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extraordinary rendition, the U.S. should create post-monitoring mechanisms that would 
also serve as a check to decrease the possibility of torture.  This would help reduce the 
tension between the national security goals of the United States to obtain intelligence and 
obligations under the CAT.  Further, human rights violations will subsequently decrease 
because there is a concerted effort to strengthen oversight and increase accountability. 
In addition to the CAT, the U.S. governs its actions according to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949, which places certain limitations on U.S. extraordinary renditions.  
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention protects specific categories of individuals 
and states that when there is an armed conflict that is not international, each state must 
provide “de minimum” protections to individuals that do not take active part in 
hostilities.227  States are required to treat individuals humanely and are prohibited from 
using violence, cruel treatment, or torture.  The Bush Administration initially held that 
the Geneva Convention did not apply to enemy combatants. 
The Administration asserted that Common Article 3 applies to conflicts that are 
not international conflicts and the conflict at hand has an international scope.228  
Specifically, the administration argued that the war on terror is neither international 
because it does not involve a “state against state” conflict nor is it non-international 
“because it transcends national boundaries.”229  Rather, this is a global war on terror and 
therefore the Geneva Convention does not apply.  However, the United States Supreme 
Court held otherwise.230  The Court in Hamdan highlighted the importance of the Geneva 
Convention, holding that there are minimum levels of protections even if the 
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Convention’s provisions do not cover a person.231  Based on the precedent set forth in 
Hamdan, the United States has subsequently accepted the application of the Geneva 
Convention generally.232  Hamdan suggests that a rendered individual should receive 
minimum process before transfer to a foreign state.    
While the CAT and the Geneva Convention provide a framework for the 
treatment of individuals subject to extraordinary renditions, and diplomatic assurances 
are utilized to increase accountability, extraordinary rendition still presents a rule of law 
problem.  All governments that engage in extraordinary renditions face this challenge.  
There is an inherent lack of agreement in the international community regarding how to 
permit extraordinary renditions while maintaining oversight and accountability.  The 
international community acknowledges that the United States must be held accountable 
and should uphold human rights obligations during transfers.233  The Bush 
Administration’s wide discretion regarding the extraordinary rendition program 
undermined confidence within the international community.  The Administration 
implemented an expansive extraordinary rendition policy while using diplomatic 
assurances; however, they failed to establish a set of standards to keep themselves 
accountable.   
As early as 1994, the State Department published annual reports concluding that 
Egypt uses: 
torture…to extract information. … Detainees are frequently stripped to 
their underwear; hung by their wrists with their feet touching the floor or 
forced to stand for prolonged periods; doused with hot and cold water; 
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beaten; forced to stand outdoors in cold weather; and subjected to electric 
shocks.234  
 
The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights confirmed the use of torture stating that 
there were 567 cases of torture within police stations, 167 deaths resulting from torture, 
and mistreatment between 1993 and July 2007.235  The State Department has annually 
confirmed that Syria also engages in torture, stating that “torture and abuse of detainees 
was...common.  Many instances of abuse went unreported.” 236  The use of written 
diplomatic assurances with countries that hold poor human rights records based on the 
State Department’s assessment is a violation of the CAT.  The continued use of 
extraordinary renditions to countries with poor human rights records deteriorates the 
program’s compliance with the rule of law and international standards.237    
President Bush and his Administration had an opportunity to set a benchmark by 
which the U.S. could measure the rule of law and its applicability to extraordinary 
renditions.  Instead of creating a stronger regulatory framework to create oversight and 
prevent human rights violations, the Administration chose an ad hoc see as you go 
approach.  As a result extraordinary renditions run the risk of rule of law violations 
because they create structural problems due to the lack of proper oversight and 
accountability.238  While the President obtained authorization through the AUMF to 
conduct extraordinary renditions, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi, Rasul, 
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Hamdan, and Boumediene suggest that some oversight measures should be adopted to 
decrease institutional harms.  The President has the authority to constitutionally conduct 
extraordinary renditions; however, this does not account for his moral authority 
internationally when claims of torture exist.  The ad hoc nature of the extraordinary 
rendition program makes oversight difficult due to the creation of partnerships outside a 
transparent framework.  Creating a legal regime that enforces stronger standards of 
accountability and less operational flexibility will strengthen the extraordinary rendition 
program’s compliance with the rule of law.  This will shift the burden to the executive 
branch to adhere to the law when making decisions to render an individual to a foreign 
state.   
 Extraordinary renditions also create an accountability gap because many 
allegations of torture have arisen post-transfer, yet the U.S. government has successfully 
denied responsibility through the use of the state secret privilege.  Allowing for 
accountability during extraordinary renditions will not prevent the executive branch from 
transferring suspects to achieve policy goals; rather, it creates consistency and assumes 
responsibility for U.S. national security objectives.239  To close the accountability gap 
before and after a extraordinary rendition, the United States must raise the bar and refuse 
to render individuals to countries that have well-documented suspicious human rights 
records.  To further enhance accountability post-extraordinary rendition, the United 
States should monitor the transfer to ensure that the foreign state is abiding by their 
diplomatic assurances.  This will provide greater oversight and accountability of 
extraordinary renditions.  The creation of a stronger oversight mechanism will ensure that 
the executive branch does not allow an extraordinary rendition that could potentially 
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violate the rule of law and forces officials to consider the human rights records of a 
foreign state before authorizing them. 
While the President has the authority to conduct extraordinary renditions, the U.S. 
must increase accountability and oversight to deter continuous human rights allegations 
of torture.  Extraordinary renditions have taken place to countries such as Syria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and numerous other foreign states where coercive interrogations and 
torture occur.  Regardless of claims that individuals will not be sent to countries that 
“violate our human values” by President Bush and now the current Obama 
Administration, the lack of stronger regulations reinforces the idea that extraordinary 
renditions may sometimes result in a legal backwater for torture.240    
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Part Four: Future of Extraordinary Rendition  
The Bush Administration failed to establish clear guidelines for the extraordinary 
rendition of individuals suspected of terrorism and to make a forceful statement that the 
United States complies with the rule of law and international treaties.  Unfortunately, 
with extensive reliance on executive power, extraordinary renditions lack the appearance 
of objective accountability and buck a tradition of the balance of power set forth in the 
Constitution.  As a result the rule of law is the ultimate casualty.  The three branches of 
government must work together to determine a middle ground that checks executive 
supremacy with the rule of law; this will allow the U.S. to balance the nation’s security 
with its integrity.  However, one quick resolution or congressional bill will not provide a 
solution.  Reforming extraordinary rendition requires a multi-faceted approach, which 
includes: an assessment of the totality of circumstances before an extraordinary rendition 
is permitted; diplomatic assurances; and post-monitoring of individuals rendered to 
foreign states.  These additional oversight mechanisms will strengthen compliance with 
the rule of law in the United States.    
To address policy gaps in the extraordinary rendition program, there are possible 
solutions that could strengthen accountability and oversight.  The President and Congress 
could require a pre-extraordinary rendition review via an Article III court, thereby 
mimicking habeas corpus review as suggested by the Supreme Court in the detention 
cases of Rasul and Hamdi.241  The Supreme Court recognized and society accepted the 
protections offered by Article III courts as a means of ensuring a fair trial.  The 
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Constitution embodies both procedural and substantive due process.242  Substantive due 
process means that the government will not detain an individual against his or her will 
without a constitutional basis for his or her detention.  Next, procedural due process 
offers safeguards so that the individual is protected from loss of liberty and life.243  As a 
result it seems evident that detention of an individual before transferring him or her to a 
foreign state requires some due process to abide by the rule of law. 
Applied to extraordinary renditions, Article III courts can balance the national 
security interest the state against of the rendered suspect against his or her liberty 
interest.244  To adequately balance the interests of the individual against the government, 
Article III courts could ensure the diplomatic assurance is valid and review the foreign 
country’s human rights record, provided by the State Department, before an extraordinary 
rendition occurs.  To protect the government’s national security interests, the court may 
utilize safeguards within the state secret privilege to prevent disclosure of sensitive 
information during the trial regarding the extraordinary rendition.245   
Supporters of the use of federal courts argue that courts have handled matters of 
national security successfully in the past.246  Article III courts are equipped to ensure that 
the rule of law is upheld and to provide an equilibrium between national security interests 
and the civil liberties of the rendered detainee.  This additional review would enhance 
transparency and strengthen oversight.  In terms of accountability, after all appropriate 
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entities have authorized the extraordinary rendition and ensured that a diplomatic 
assurance exists with a country that complies with the CAT, the third country would be 
liable under the CAT and international law for violations that occur.   
Even though reports by Human Rights First suggest that the justice system is well 
equipped to handle terrorism cases, Article III courts will face similar obstacles while 
reviewing extraordinary rendition as detention cases including:  i) the dangers of 
individuals obtaining access to classified information and subsequent disclosure of 
classified evidence to the public; ii) strict standards for evidence that prevents admission 
of certain evidence; iii) security challenges and threats of physical harm to trial 
participants; iv) lack of consistency; and v) difficulty reviewing diplomatic assurances. 
247 
While Article III courts have the ability to review extraordinary rendition cases, 
critics note that they face the danger of suspects obtaining classified information and the 
subsequent potential disclosure of classified intelligence to the public, either 
inadvertently or due to the nature of the trial.248  During a criminal trial, discovery rules 
compel disclosure of the government’s evidence and the list of witnesses.  As a result the 
defendant is privy to intelligence that may be revealed to co-conspirators and can 
potentially pose a hazard to national security.  Other times the defendant may seek 
disclosure of sensitive information to corner the government into divulging sensitive 
intelligence or forgoing prosecution.  While the prosecution may have a protective order 
to prevent disclosure of classified information by allowing for generic descriptions of 
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data, the reality remains that the actual presentation of proof remains open to the 
public.249     
Article III courts also face a stringent standard for admission of evidence that 
remains unchangeable.250  Critics argue that Article III courts are too strict, and 
information that is compelling would be inadmissible because of hearsay restrictions, 
authentication requirements, and the application of the exclusionary rules to illegal 
searches.  During extraordinary rendition cases evidence may come in numerous forms, 
such as eyewitness testimony, hearsay, and physical or documentary searches, which the 
rules of evidence would not permit.251  The evidence rules could potentially serve as an 
obstacle because it may prevent the admission of compelling evidence to render an 
individual.  As a result the extraordinary rendition is thwarted, which prevents the 
gathering of potentially valuable intelligence. 
Next, Article III courts remain a costly solution for pre-extraordinary rendition 
review, due to the classification requirements for sensitive evidence, maintaining the 
physical safety of proceedings, and providing protection for witnesses.252  Article III 
courts have difficulty maintaining the physical security of detention trials.  As a result 
these trials require armed guards and twenty-four hour protection for federal judges that 
prosecute individuals tied to al-Qaeda.  Similarly extraordinary rendition cases require 
secure facilities and authorized personnel holding high security clearances to protect 
classified information.  In addition there are reoccurring challenges when trying to 
protect this intelligence, such as the possible impairment of attorney-client 
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communication because defense counsel lacks the appropriate clearance, a lack of 
clearance for staff, and delays in proceedings due to clearance processing.253  A decision 
to render an individual is based on classified intelligence, and, as previous Attorney 
General Michael Muksey stated, detentions cannot become “a smorgasbord of classified 
information for our enemies.”254  The United States must prevent disclosure of valuable 
information after a transfer occurs.  As a result Article III courts will not provide the best 
model for U.S. reliance on a key tactical tool to combat terrorism. 
Article III courts also create a lack of consistency because case holdings depend 
on the respective district the case is tried in.  There are numerous factors, such as the 
facility and resources available to each court, which will dictate the outcome of reviewing 
classified evidence.  In some cases districts have a Sensitive Compartment Information 
Facility (SCIF), which allows for the review of classified information in a secured 
facility.  However, other districts lack this option and may have to store sensitive 
information in a nearby district, which can delay the trial.255  The differing procedural 
protections and variables presenting a lack of overall consistency raise serious legitimacy 
issues to review of extraordinary rendition cases in Article III courts.   
The protected information gathered during an extraordinary rendition is critical to 
national security, and Article III courts are not operationally or procedurally equipped for 
the challenges presented.  A former FBI official on a National Public Radio (NPR) 
interview stated that Article III courts become a “public process that after a point you can 
no longer really control.  It becomes very public what you knew about the person, and 
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that avenue of gathering information or creating new sources is kind of cut off.”256  In 
addition, Article III courts may not be able to readily review the diplomatic assurances 
for the extraordinary rendition of an individual between the United States and the third 
country due to the classification of the information.257  Requirements exist on the use of 
the information and how the information will be protected when a diplomatic assurance is 
formed between the United States and a foreign state.  Due to the manner of sharing 
intelligence, the originator controls the information.  Consequently, the foreign state will 
be less likely to allow for the dissemination of information for review by federal courts or 
a court martial.258  Overall, extraordinary rendition review by Article III courts remains 
problematic and faces numerous challenges that pose a threat to national security.259 
The ultimate goal for the extraordinary rendition program is to comply with the 
new paradigm of prevention of future terrorist attacks, while simultaneously upholding 
the rule of law.  Article III courts do not meet the requirements for the reform due to their 
lack of consistency coupled with the numerous other challenges discussed above.  
Therefore, another option for extraordinary rendition review is a trial by non-Article III 
tribunals.  These tribunals can meet under special conditions of heightened secrecy, 
similar to military commissions and review all extraordinary renditions before the 
transfer occurs.260  Military commissions have been utilized during or after wars on an ad 
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hoc basis during major conflicts such as the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and 
World War II.261    
During the War on Terror, President Bush implemented the use of military 
commissions post-9/11 to try individuals suspected of terrorism.  Modifications are 
necessary; however, President Bush’s strategy remains instructive for procedures that 
could address the concerns with the extraordinary rendition program.  Tribunals will 
alleviate the burdens of Article III courts by allowing the United States to shift from its 
current policy that lacks proper accountability and oversight towards a legal framework 
that allows the U.S. to strategically combat terrorism in a system of legally accepted 
norms.262  In addition military commissions follow international law by complying with 
Article 75 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
provides a framework for universal standards of due process for individuals suspected of 
terrorism.263 
Military commissions provide many procedural safeguards for the accused that 
would strengthen oversight and accountability for extraordinary rendition cases.  Each 
commission consists of between three to seven commissioned U.S. Officers appointed by 
the Secretary of Defense to oversee the trial.  A two/thirds vote is sufficient to convict the 
individual.  Many of the rules, standards of proof, and presumptions of innocence are 
similar to Article III courts.  The individual has access to a military counsel or may retain 
outside counsel.264  The burden of proof necessary for a conviction is the same for a 
military commission as it is for a civilian court: guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  While 
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similarities exist between Article III courts and commissions, there are also many 
procedural differences that allow the commissions to better maintain national security 
and efficiently review instances of extraordinary rendition.  The review of extraordinary 
renditions poses similar demands that detention cases require, specifically the admission 
of evidence that may not pass the stringent requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a need for secrecy based on the classified nature of the intelligence, 
and personnel security.   
Military commissions are not required to divulge information as frequently as 
Article III courts.  Commissions are designed to allow for a broader evaluation, thereby 
including all forms of evidence that a reasonable person would find probative, such as 
hearsay.265  Military commissions also protect classified information through rules that 
apply to “Protected Information.”266  This includes classified information protected by 
law, information that could threaten national security, the safety of an individual involved 
in the proceedings, or law enforcement.267  Government counsel may protect classified 
information through a motion.  When the military judge finds the evidence relevant to the 
offense, the judge has three options to protect the intelligence: the redaction of the 
classified information; the substitution of the portion of the document with unclassified 
information; or the substitution of the facts that the classified information intended to 
prove.  Further, tribunals are equipped with intelligence protections that Article III courts 
lack, such as counsel that hold the appropriate security clearance, security for 
administrative staff, and clear procedural standards for handling classified information.  
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Overall, tribunals are a viable option for pre-extraordinary rendition reviews before 
individuals are transferred to foreign states due to their secrecy. 
Foreign countries are more apt to rely on a military commission when diplomatic 
assurances are reviewed because there is greater confidence that military commissions 
secure information appropriately.  As a result a military commission would protect 
classified information, while simultaneously allowing a judge to monitor the decisions of 
the General Counsel of the CIA, top officials, and oversight committees in Congress.  
This would ensure that extraordinary renditions are in compliance with the rule of law 
and strengthen procedures to ensure that torture will not occur after extraordinary 
rendition of the individual a foreign state. 
Opponents of the use of a new tribunal may put forward the same criticisms they 
have against the use of military tribunals in detention cases.  Critics argue that military 
commissions curtail human rights and depart from the rule of law.  Commissions 
minimize the system of checks and balances and allow the executive branch to supplant 
judicial functions.268  Further, critics assert that military commissions are biased because 
they serve the interests of national security and give more weight to the government’s 
safety concerns over the interest of a rendered individual.269  While military commissions 
are not the perfect solution, modifications to tailor the process to provide oversight and 
accountability over the extraordinary rendition program will strengthen this vital counter-
terrorism tool.  To allow for military commissions to review extraordinary renditions, 
Congress should enact a statute analogous to the Military Commissions Act (MCA) 
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passed after Hamdan.  The MCA provided for a legal framework that created procedural 
rules for commissions and a system of checks and balances.270  Congress passed 
guidelines that dictated how the tribunal would operate and ensured oversight by 
allowing individuals to appeal decisions of military judges to a civilian justice system.  If 
the appeal was denied, then an additional oversight mechanism was placed to review the 
detention for the final time by the United States Court of Appeals in the District of 
Columbia.271  Further, the Act specifically provided oversight by providing that 
detentions must not be inconsistent with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which 
strictly prohibits cruel and degrading treatment.  
Military tribunals could strengthen oversight and accountability of extraordinary 
renditions to better comply with the rule of law.  Tribunals allow for a neutral decision 
maker to determine whether the individual subject to the extraordinary rendition will be 
subject to torture.  Each decision should be consistent with the CAT.  Further, the 
decision to render a suspect should include a factors test based on: the identity of the 
individual providing the assurance; the use of torture in the military, prison, or criminal 
justice system of the receiving state; the difference in treatment between a common 
criminal and an individual suspected of terrorism; the willingness of the country to abide 
by the CAT; the priority the foreign state places on maintaining bilateral relations with 
the United States; and the agreeability of the foreign country to allow the U.S. to monitor 
compliance with the CAT.  This determination must be coupled with the individual’s 
testimony regarding his or her relationship with the receiving state.  This creates a quasi-
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adversarial process, which allows the court to reach a better decision regarding the 
rendition.   
In addition to the factors test, the court should consider unclassified materials 
such as human rights reports prepared by the U.S. State Department and non-
governmental agencies such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.  This 
will provide the court with a balanced assessment of the country’s human right records 
and allow judges to make an independent factual determination regarding whether the 
rendered individual is more likely than not to face torture.  Further, the court creates 
transparency by allowing the public to access materials that the judge has based his or her 
independent ruling on. 
After the court has used a multi-faceted approach through the factors test, 
consideration of human rights records, and validity that the diplomatic assurance abides 
by the CAT to support a extraordinary rendition, the U.S. should implement a post-
monitoring mechanism.  This allows the United States to have some oversight and 
accountability over the extraordinary rendition.  While the main crux of extraordinary 
rendition is to transfer an individual outside the realm of U.S. control, the limits of the 
rule of law constrain decisions that will lead to torture.  Post-monitoring will allow the 
U.S. and the receiving state to not only exchange vital intelligence information obtained 
from the rendered suspect, but also ensure that treatment is in compliance with U.S. and 
international legal instruments. 
Achieving compliance according to international standards and building 
accountability with the U.S. Constitution is a task President Obama should take more 
seriously than his predecessor.  However, compliance and accountability do not require 
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curbing the use of extraordinary rendition at the expense of national security.  The 
Obama Administration understands this fact and embraces extraordinary rendition.  
President Obama recognizes renditions value in the War on Terror.272  To respond to the 
criticisms of the extraordinary rendition program, President Obama created a Special 
Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies pursuant to Executive Order 13491 on 
January 22, 2009.273  The task force evaluated the transfer of individuals and its 
compliance with domestic law and international obligations to circumvent undermining 
the rule of law.274  The order states that the Administration will only use extraordinary 
rendition to transfer individuals to foreign states that comply with U.S. and international 
law.275   
In August 2009, the task force made recommendations to the extraordinary 
rendition program to ensure that transfers complied with U.S. and international law and 
did not result in the use of torture.  In terms of assurances, the task force advised 
strengthening the procedure for obtaining and evaluating them before an extraordinary 
rendition.276  This includes allowing the State, Homeland Security, and Defense 
Departments to coordinate reports on transfers annually.  To improve monitoring post-
extraordinary rendition, the task force suggested that the U.S. insist on a mechanism to 
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monitor the individual or establish a method to allow for access to the individual without 
advance notice to the foreign state.   
Attorney General Holder stated: “There is no tension between strengthening our 
national security and meeting our commitment to the rule of law, and these new policies 
will accomplish both.”277  However, in response to the task force findings, human rights 
advocates still have many of the same criticisms and concerns.  While the executive order 
ensures humane treatment of individuals consistent with the Bush Administration’s 
policy, it fails to specifically guarantee that individuals rendered to foreign states will be 
free from cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment that does not amount to torture.  As a 
result the policy and the accountability gaps remain unchanged.   
The Obama Administration’s reliance on the extraordinary rendition program is 
publicly known.  Attorney General Holder expressed his concerns regarding 
extraordinary renditions to countries that would not treat suspects consistent with U.S. 
laws; however, he further stated that he does not want to “restrict the ability of our 
government to use all the techniques that we can to keep the American people safe, but in 
using those tools, we have to do so in a way that's consistent with our treaty obligations 
and values as a nation.”278  CIA Director Leon Panetta champions the same standard 
implemented by the Bush Administration, asserting that the CIA will continue to render 
individuals.  While the extraordinary rendition program serves the national security 
interests of the U.S., the Obama Administration must create additional accountability, 
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transparency, and oversight to generate greater confidence that individuals are afforded 
process and that the program complies with the rule of law.279   
President Obama’s policies convey an understanding of the importance of the 
extraordinary rendition program and express recognition that the program must be 
regulated by the rule of law.  The question remains whether President Obama is willing to 
invest the time and political capital needed to succeed where President Bush failed.  Is 
President Obama willing to release some control of the extraordinary rendition program 
to create a multi-faceted approach that aggressively implements and enforces 
congressional regulations and acquiesces to judicial oversight?  While this decision is 
pending, the Obama administration must consider that Americans are safer today due to 
extraordinary rendition program.  Terrorists such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, Abu 
Zubaydah, Mr. Hambali, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, Khalid bin Attash, and several dozen other 
senior al-Qaeda leaders were rendered by the United States.  As a result, proponents of 
the extraordinary rendition program assert that this policy remains the single most 
effective counterterrorism operation ever conducted by the United States.280 
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treaty traders and investors, inter-company transferees, persons with extraordinary 
abilities, PERM/Labor certification process, and legal permanent residence status. 
• Compose weekly memos analyzing foreign labor and employment law to 
determine best practices for establishing international corporate branches and 
subsidiaries.  
 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. – Political Military Affairs Regional Arms 
Transfer Intern (Summer 2010) 
• Resolved Middle East security sector assistance issues on behalf of senior 
leadership in Political Military Affairs. 
• Drafted action memos for foreign military funding, third party transfer requests 
and change in end-use violations. 
• Prepared congressional report on the major transfers of conventional and 
unconventional arms sales by the United States and other countries to the Middle 
East pursuant to 404(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 
 
Attorney General’s Office, Law Clerk for Criminal Appeals Division Indianapolis, IN 
(Fall 2009) 
• Assisted with all phases of litigation including investigating facts, conducting 
legal research, and preparing appellate briefs on behalf of Deputy Attorney 
General.  
• Presented case facts and research to assigned attorney to assist with hearings and 
trials. 
• Participated in trial strategy meetings and discussed issues that may arise during 
litigation.   
  
 
Judge Richard Magnus, Singapore – Terrorism Analyst (Summer 2009) 
• Prepared confidential legal profiles of ASEAN participants to analyze each 
country’s implementation of the U.N. Security Council Terrorism Resolutions. 
• Developed ASEAN country reports to determine the judicial response to the 
Internal Security Act.  
• Wrote a legal brief espousing Singapore’s superior application of the rule of law 
during national emergencies. 
